After reading “Turnaround in the Bandits of Bravo Company” and PPT, using the Armenakis-Harris-Feild Model to answer these two questions.(1) Through the use of this model, how did Captain Edwards demonstrate good change leadership? Note—there is no right or wrong answer. This is your opinion. (2) How might you apply in what you do in your organization?only need to answer one page
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LODJ
31,6
Turnaround in the bandits
of Bravo Company
Dominick Edwards
US Army, and
518
Dennis R. Self and Mike Schraeder
Sorrell College of Business, Troy University Montgomery,
Montgomery, Alabama, USA
Received April 2009
Revised January 2010
Accepted January 2010
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to retroactively study a positive organizational change by
showing how the elements of readiness creation and the change strategies in a widely accepted change
model applied to a 20-month change in one US Army company.
Design/methodology/approach – The commander was not familiar with many of the contemporary
change management models. Retrospective analysis of the change strategies reveals congruence with
components of a widely accepted change model. The commander’s actions, matched with the model’s
components, highlighting the model’s potential value in the military.
Findings – The most significant finding is that a military commander with limited theoretical
experience in organizational change successfully turned around a military unit while unconsciously
paralleling an existing change model, suggesting that the military should study the model further.
Research limitations/implications – The paper is limited by the number of organizations studied.
Practical implications – One implication is that military leaders and other professionals can benefit
by looking outside traditional sources for tools and inspiration to solve challenging problems in their
unique environments.
Originality/value – This application of the organizational change model outside a business setting
suggests that the model may have greater utility than previously thought. Additionally, the application
of business change management strategy in a military organization impacts on military professionals
who are seeking new ways of conducting operations. Finally, the paper is original because of the
retroactive change model application, suggesting the model is grounded in leadership and
organizational development theory and practice.
Keywords Organizational change, Armed forces, United States of America
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Organizations are increasingly operating in an environment that has become global
(Ghoshal, 1987), intensely competitive (David, 2006), and economically volatile
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). Simultaneously, organizations are dealing with significant
technological changes (Wanberg and Banas, 2000) and workforce changes (Lerman and
Schmidt, 2006). Organizations intent on sustained survival and competitiveness do not
have the luxury of being content with status quo. Failure to anticipate and respond to these
Leadership & Organization
Development Journal
Vol. 31 No. 6, 2010
pp. 518-533
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0143-7739
DOI 10.1108/01437731011070014
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Pseudonyms are used in this paper to protect the identity of the specific organizational units
and/or individuals discussed.
environmental changes can result in loss of competitive position, erosion of shareholder
support, and even the demise of an organization (Collins, 2001; Vollman, 1996).
Consequently, organizations cannot be content with current success or complacent with
dysfunctional units, but must instead look for continual improvements and actively seek
to turn-around dysfunctional units (Grinyer and McKiernan, 1990; Pearce and Robbins,
1994; Robbins and Pearce, 1992, 1993). Contemporary organizational change literature
typically focuses on corporations, with tangential or anecdotal consideration of selected
governmental or non-profit organizations such as hospitals (Nutt, 1986; Rousseau and
Tijoriwala, 1999). However, America’s military must also deal with change, not only at the
organizational level (Hartman, 2007), but also at the unit and individual levels as well
(Agency Group 05, 2006; Thompson et al., 2007).
In the US Army, one significant cause of change is personnel turnover in
all-concomitant organizations. Army soldiers can expect new commanders approximately
every two years at the battalion level and every 12-24 months at the company level.
Despite all the official policies, procedures and stacks of manuals, each change in
leadership brings consequent changes to the organization, with some organizations
becoming more efficient while others do not. One case of a unit increasing its
effectiveness during a leadership change was the change of the bandits of Bravo Company
(a pseudonym for an armor or tank company) over an intense, eight-month period. This
tank company quickly rose from one of the worst of six companies in the brigade to one of
the best companies. The purpose of this paper is to retroactively study a positive change in
an organization showing how the elements of readiness creation and the change strategies
outlined in a widely accepted change model (Armenakis et al., 1999) applied to specific
elements of the change, an approach that ultimately enhanced the overall success of the
commander’s efforts.
The Armenakis et al. model was selected because Armenakis et al. view the
implementation of a change initiative as a process, rather than providing a prescriptive
recipe for the change manager to follow. As Burnes (1996, p. 187) observes, “[. . .] change
should not be [. . .] seen as a series of linear events within a given period of time; instead,
it is viewed as a continuous process”. Pettigrew (1987) likewise argues that change must
be considered through the complex interaction of the content of the change, the process
of the change, and the context (both internal and external) in which the organization and
the intended change exist. As such, such n-step prescriptions for change such as that
recommended by Kotter (1996) should be viewed with caution. Process models, such as
the Armenakis et al. (1999) model are not necessarily as widely discussed as the
prescriptive models largely due to the associated level of their complexity. Nevertheless,
the Armenakis model is one that has proven viable as a lens through which to view
change in organizations (Bernerth, 2004; Holt et al., 2007; Self, 2005; Walker et al., 2007).
Evolution of the bandits study
Much has been written about how to change an organization, with advice coming from
consultants and academics. Further, there are many courses taught on managing change.
However, as is often the case at the unit level within an organization, managers are tasked
with taking their unit or department through a change without the training or advice and
counsel from the experts on what steps to take, what process to follow. In the particular
case addressed in this paper through the form of a narrative, a young captain was charged
with turning around a failing tank company. If his efforts were not successful the unit
Turnaround
in the bandits
519
LODJ
31,6
520
would be dissolved and the soldiers scattered throughout the US Army. To his credit, he
was successful in turning around the company, despite having no formal “change
management” training.
Subsequently, during a graduate course in management he sought to make sense of
what had happened and why he had been successful within a change management
context. Sense-making (Weick, 1995) is a critical role for managers when change is called
for. As organizational members first learn of, and then begin to grapple with a change,
they will attempt to understand (or make sense of) what is happening and why. The role of
the manager is to “give sense” to the organizational members of the change. While
resistance may still occur once organizational members realize how the change will impact
them, they most certainly will be resistant to a change which they do not understand.
This discomfort with uncertainty (Palmer et al., 2009) requires sense-making.
That sense-making must come from the manager; however, before he or she can “give
sense” he or she must make sense of it themselves. Barge and Oliver (2003, pp. 138-9) note
that managers need, “[. . .] to be able to provide legitimate arguments and reasons for why
their actions fit within the situation and should be viewed as legitimate”.
The approach taken for this study is that of a narrative approach (Cresswell, 2007),
in which one of the authors tells his “story” of a change which he not only experienced,
but, as commander of the tank company, was required to lead. The story is viewed
through the process lens of the Armenakis et al. (1999) model and as the lead author
and his co-authors worked through the story, that process enabled the sense-making
outcome found herein.
Changing a dysfunctional military unit
Defining the problem in the company
The bandits were one of the three tank companies of a battalion in a US Army brigade
located at a military post in the USA. During a recent decade, the company earned a solid
reputation as a very good tank company often receiving the most difficult and challenging
missions. However, just prior to the new commander’s appointment as leader of the
company, the company began to slide toward mediocrity in all key operational aspects.
The situation became so dire that the battalion commander elected to break the company
apart prior to an operational deployment. Rather than deploy and train as a company,
the soldiers in the company filled personnel shortages in the rest of the battalion and the
company leadership formed an emergency operations cell that handled administrative
tasks from a rear area. Upon returning from deployment the company reformed, and
gained a new commander.
In general, tank companies are rated based upon a few quantifiable tasks as well as
some that are more difficult to quantify. First, the company must maintain its tanks and
equipment so they are always fully mission capable or prepared for a mission at any
time. The measure of this is called the operational readiness rate (OR) and is expressed as
a percentage, with a goal of at least 90 percent. Second, tank companies are expected to
meet certain standards in shooting competition, and the qualification scores of each crew
and platoon are carefully measured and compared. Crews also strive to qualify their
tanks on the first attempt. Every company’s goal is to earn the title of top tank company
during the semi-annual qualification exercises.
Physical fitness is a third measure of effectiveness for a tank company. This is
measured in several ways. First, the army mandates that all soldiers must take and pass
the army physical fitness test (APFT) two times per year. Companies are evaluated on
their overall average, having the highest number of soldiers score above 290 out of
300 points, and on having the fewest failures. Closely related to this is how many soldiers
are overweight and do not meet minimum body fat standards.
In addition to quantitative measures of effectiveness, the army values the qualitative
attributes of morale and pride. While admittedly difficult to measure, it is readily apparent
when collective morale and pride are absent.
Prior to the deployment, the bandits consistently had the worst OR in the battalion.
During one training exercise, some of those present joked that the battalion maintenance
officer should be the commander since there were more broken tanks than operational
ones in the company. On any given day there were from two to six non-mission capable
tanks of the 14 assigned to the company. In the past, it had been suggested that the
problem was based upon the age of the tanks, but other companies did not post similar
results. Other problems were found. Upon inspection of the unit’s arms room, the
incoming commander discovered broken night vision equipment. This equipment had
been broken for a considerable time and there was no apparent plan to repair or replace
the equipment.
The company’s gunnery scores were deplorable as well. The company had not been
the top tank company in nearly three years and had never come close to achieving the
goal. Crew scores were low overall and the platoon scores reflected this trend as well.
The company had the highest number of Q2 s, a term used when a crew fails to qualify
their tank on the first attempt, in the battalion.
On the final quantitative measure of effectiveness, physical fitness, the company
posted the worst physical fitness statistics in the battalion. The company average was
217 points out of a possible 300, far behind the other companies averaging between
235 and 260. When the incoming commander administered his first APFT, 11 soldiers
failed the event. Upon further investigation, there were five soldiers who had not passed an
APFT in nearly two years. All of the commanders who received bounty hunter soldiers
during the recent deployment noted that these soldiers were poor runners. Additionally,
there were eight soldiers who were overweight, as well as over the acceptable body fat
percentage. It is worth noting that four leaders were among this group.
The soldiers’ morale in the company was very low. Lacking pride in the company,
soldiers would not respond with the company motto at appropriate times.
The company’s breakup for the deployment created part of the morale problem.
Many of the soldiers confided that they did not want to return to the bandits after the
deployment because they were tired of being in a bad organization. Upon release of the
name of the incoming commander, several senior leaders approached him and discussed
their concerns about the company and stated there needed to be some major changes.
The incoming commander recognized many of the problems in the company. During the
deployment, the new commander got to know many of the soldiers in the company and
had been pleasantly surprised at their overall quality. The soldiers appeared intelligent
and hardworking. Many of them made great contributions to the battalion in other roles.
Clearly they had potential.
Creating readiness for change in the company
Prior to assuming command, the incoming commander took stock of the problems in
the company and began devising a strategy to change the company. He read leadership
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books in the preceding months and focused on leaders who had either made significant
changes to their organizations or had maintained a quality organization over time.
The two most critical books from this were both written by sports coaches (Billick and
Peterson, 2001; Krzyzewski and Phillips, 2001). The Krzyzewski and Phillips book was
instrumental in enabling the new company commander to develop the company vision
and the Billick and Peterson book provided an outstanding refresher in leadership and
organizational change. Armed with this knowledge, personal experience, and years of
leadership study, the incoming commander developed a company vision of how he
wanted the company to perform with regard to tank gunnery, physical fitness,
maintenance, and the family readiness group (FRG). This vision for the company
allowed him to write his command philosophy explaining how he would lead the
company toward this goal. This philosophy became an implicit contract between him
and the soldiers in the company. After completing these tasks, he developed a change
plan that would allow him to lead the company to achieve the results they deserved.
What remained unknown at the time was the company’s reaction to the plan and how
to convince them to change without letting them think that the new commander
wanted to change everything just for the sake of change.
Of particular interest in this paper is the realization that, after a retrospective analysis
of the commander’s actions, many of the actions undertaken parallel a widely accepted
change model developed by Armenakis et al. (1999). What follows is an illustrated
summary of the major change strategies undertaken by the commander, matched with
the accompanying elements of the Armenakis et al. (1999) change model. The first
section summarizes actions taken by the commander to create readiness for change, with
parallels drawn to the readiness elements of the Armenakis et al. (1999) model (Table I).
According to the Armenakis et al. (1999) model, the first element (and essential first
step) for creating readiness for change is discrepancy. Discrepancy is defined as the
organization’s recognition that a change is necessary. This is generally portrayed as a
performance gap, which demonstrates the difference in the way things are and the way
they should be (Armenakis and Harris, 2002). Once organizational members understand
that a gap exists, they are taking the first step toward making change. As a new
company leader, the commander recognized that he did not fully understand the internal
culture of the organization. Additionally, as a new commander, he was concerned about
his credibility (Kouzes and Posner, 1993) in the minds of the company’s soldiers.
However, it was essential to determine if the soldiers recognized the need for change.
Change message
component
Discrepancy
Appropriateness
Self-efficacy
Table I.
Creating readiness:
the change message
Principal support
Personal valence
Description
An organization’s recognition that the change is necessary given the
difference in the way things are and the way they should be (Armenakis
and Harris, 2002)
An indication that the change is the correct, proper or right change
An individual’s belief that they are capable of successfully making
the change
Recognizable support of the change by formal and informal leaders
An indication that the change has value or is meaningful to the
individuals effected
In order to gauge the level of perceived discrepancy in the company, he met with all the
company’s key leaders 2 hours after he assumed command. As they gathered in his
office, he introduced himself and summarized his leadership philosophy. Such practice
is standard for most incoming commanders, but what happened next surprised many
of them. He went to the white board and told the most vocal platoon sergeant in the
group to identify two things the company did well and two things the company
could improve upon. The platoon sergeant listed his items and discussed them. This
engendered further discussion on his choices. The commander continued to go around
the room with this method until the board was full of information and it was time to
leave for the day. He had planned for this exercise to take 1 hour, but it took 3 hours
and he did not get to everyone in the room. At the end of the discussion, the commander
had a list of strengths and weaknesses with the unit, clearly indicating perceived
discrepancy reflected in the fact that individuals did not like the way things were
running in the company and wanted to change.
After the leader’s meeting, the commander met with key leaders individually to
gather their thoughts in a private setting. Most agreed that things could not continue
operating as status quo. He also had many informal discussions with the soldiers in the
company to gauge their level of perceived discrepancy. Most individuals wanted to do
well and were willing to change, but did not know how. Some did not see the need to
change and the commander knew that his efforts would have to address the
perceptions of these individuals (principal support).
During this process, the commander was always prepared to produce empirical data
that would support past performance and could ask if this was acceptable. Every
individual in the company agreed that they could do better (self-efficacy). Since the
individuals in the company had been deployed recently, the current global war on terror
provided reinforcement that change was necessary (discrep …
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