Consider our readings and discussions so far. Utilizing the texts to back up your assertions, respond to the following questions.Who ended up being correct, the Federalists or the Anti Federalists? Why? Consider our discussion of the Washington state constitution to demonstrate your contention. What are the costs and benefits associated with our current separation of powers between states and the federal government? Please utilize one relatively current controversy considering state vs. federal rights. Discussions of enumerated v. plenary/positive v. negative liberties are helpful to your explanation. Here are some readings u need. And the article is about 500-750 words.
2_1_anti_federalist__1.pdf
2_2_federalist__17.pdf
2_3_jefferson___letter_to_adams.pdf
4_4_wa_constitution.pdf
4_11_elections.pdf
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I
18 October 1787
To the Citizens of the State of New-York.
When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which
not only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but
upon which the happiness and misery of generations yet unborn is in great
measure suspended, the benevolent mind cannot help feeling itself peculiarly
interested in the result.
In this situation, I trust the feeble efforts of an individual, to lead the
minds of the people to a wise and prudent determination, cannot fail of
being acceptable to the candid and dispassionate part of the community.
Encouraged by this consideration, I have been induced to offer my thoughts
upon the present important crisis of our public affairs.
Perhaps this country never saw so critical a period in their political
concerns. We have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these
United-States are held together, and the want of sufficient energy in our
present confederation, to manage, in some instances, our general concerns.
Various expedients have been proposed to remedy these evils, but none have
succeeded. At length a Convention of the states has been assembled, they
have formed a constitution which will now, probably, be submitted to the
people to ratify or reject, who are the fountain of all power, to whom alone
it of right belongs to make or unmake constitutions, or forms of government,
at their pleasure. The most important question that was ever proposed to
your decision, or to the decision of any people under heaven, is before you,
and you are to decide upon it by men of your own election, chosen specially
for this purpose. If the constitution, offered to your acceptance, be a wise
one, calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of liberty, to secure
the inestimable rights of mankind, and promote human happiness, then, if you
accept it, you will lay a lasting foundation of happiness for millions yet
unborn; generations to come will rise up and call you blessed. You may
rejoice in the prospects of this vast extended continent becoming filled
with freemen, who will assert the dignity of human nature. You may solace
yourselves with the idea, that society, in this favoured land, will fast
advance to the highest point of perfection; the human mind will expand in
knowledge and virtue, and the golden age be, in some measure, realised. But
if, on the other hand, this form of government contains principles that will
lead to the subversion of liberty — if it tends to establish a despotism,
or, what is worse, a tyrannic aristocracy; then, if you adopt it, this only
remaining assylum for liberty will be shut up, and posterity will execrate
your memory.
Momentous then is the question you have to determine, and you are called
upon by every motive which should influence a noble and virtuous mind, to
examine it well, and to make up a wise judgment. It is insisted, indeed,
that this constitution must be received, be it ever so imperfect. If it has
its defects, it is said, they can be best amended when they are experienced.
But remember, when the people once part with power, they can seldom or never
resume it again but by force. Many instances can be produced in which the
people have voluntarily increased the powers of their rulers; but few, if
any, in which rulers have willingly abridged their authority. This is a
sufficient reason to induce you to be careful, in the first instance, how
you deposit the powers of government.
With these few introductory remarks, I shall proceed to a consideration of
this constitution:
The first question that presents itself on the subject is, whether a
confederated government be the best for the United States or not? Or in
other words, whether the thirteen United States should be reduced to one
great republic, governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one
executive and judicial; or whether they should continue thirteen
confederated republics, under the direction and controul of a supreme
federal head for certain defined national purposes only?
This enquiry is important, because, although the government reported by the
convention does not go to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it
approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and
infallibly terminate in it.
This government is to possess absolute and uncontroulable power,
legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which
it extends, for by the last clause of section 8th, article 1st, it is
declared “that the Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
all other powers vested by this constitution, in the government of the
United States; or in any department or office thereof.” And by the 6th
article, it is declared “that this constitution, and the laws of the United
States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the constitution, or law of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.” It appears from these articles that there is no need of
any intervention of the state governments, between the Congress and the
people, to execute any one power vested in the general government, and that
the constitution and laws of every state are nullified and declared void, so
far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this constitution, or the laws
made in pursuance of it, or with treaties made under the authority of the
United States. — The government then, so far as it extends, is a complete
one, and not a confederation…It is true this government is limited
to certain objects, or to speak more properly, some small degree of power is
still left to the states, but a little attention to the powers vested in the
general government, will convince every candid man, that if it is capable of
being executed, all that is reserved for the individual states must very
soon be annihilated, except so far as they are barely necessary to the
organization of the general government. The powers of the general
legislature extend to every case that is of the least importance — there is
nothing valuable to human nature, nothing dear to freemen, but what is
within its power. It has authority to make laws which will affect the lives,
the liberty, and property of every man in the United States; nor can the
constitution or laws of any state, in any way prevent or impede the full and
complete execution of every power given. The legislative power is competent
to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; — there is no limitation to
this power, unless it be said that the clause which directs the use to which
those taxes, and duties shall be applied, may be said to be a limitation:
but this is no restriction of the power at all, for by this clause they are
to be applied to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States; but the legislature have authority to
contract debts at their discretion; they are the sole judges of what is
necessary to provide for the common defence, and they only are to determine
what is for the general welfare; this power therefore is neither more nor
less, than a power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, at their
pleasure; not only [is] the power to lay taxes unlimited, as to the amount
they may require, but it is perfect and absolute to raise them in any mode
they please. No state legislature, or any power in the state governments,
have any more to do in carrying this into effect, than the authority of one
state has to do with that of another. In the business therefore of laying
and collecting taxes, the idea of confederation is totally lost, and that of
one entire republic is embraced. It is proper here to remark, that the
authority to lay and collect taxes is the most important of any power that
can be granted; it connects with it almost all other powers, or at least
will in process of time draw all other after it; it is the great mean of
protection, security, and defence, in a good government, and the great
engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one. This cannot fail of being the
case, if we consider the contracted limits which are set by this
constitution, to the late [state?] governments, on this article of raising
money…
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the constitution
would warrant a law of this kind; or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of the
people, by suggesting, that the federal legislature would be more likely to
pass the limits assigned them by the constitution, than that of an
individual state, further than they are less responsible to the people. But
what is meant is, that the legislature of the United States are vested with
the great and uncontroulable powers, of laying and collecting taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies,
organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and
other general powers. And are by this clause invested with the power of
making all laws, proper and necessary, for carrying all these into
execution; and they may so exercise this power as entirely to annihilate all
the state governments, and reduce this country to one single government. And
if they may do it, it is pretty certain they will; for it will be found that
the power retained by individual states, small as it is, will be a clog upon
the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter therefore will
be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it is a truth
confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, and every body
of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it, and to acquire
a superiority over every thing that stands in their way. This disposition,
which is implanted in human nature, will operate in the federal legislature
to lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority, and having such
advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the federal government succeeds
at all. It must be very evident then, that what this constitution wants of
being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union into one
complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, and
executive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire
in its exercise and operation.
Let us now proceed to enquire, as I at first proposed, whether it be best
the thirteen United States should be reduced to one great republic, or not?
It is here taken for granted, that all agree in this, that whatever
government we adopt, it ought to be a free one; that it should be so framed
as to secure the liberty of the citizens of America, and such any one as to
admit of a full, fair, and equal representation of the people. The question
then will be, whether a government thus constituted, and founded on such
principles, is practicable, and can be exercised over the whole United
States, reduced into one state?
If respect is to be paid to the opinion of the greatest and wisest men who
have ever thought or wrote on the science of government, we shall be
constrained to conclude, that a free republic cannot succeed over a country
of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants, and these
encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the whole United States.
Among the many illustrious authorities which might be produced to this
point, I shall content myself with quoting only two. The one is the baron de
Montesquieu, spirit of laws, chap. xvi. vol. I [book VIII]. “It is natural
to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long
subsist. In a large republic there are men of large fortunes, and
consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in
any single subject; he has interest of his own; he soon begins to think that
he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and
that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a
large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is
subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the
interest of the public is easier perceived, better understood, and more
within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course
are less protected.”(…)
Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are
against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be
drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government,
the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme
authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily
expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one. In a pure
democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by
themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and
decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a
country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or
at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently
assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and
declare their opinion concerning it.
In a free republic, although all laws are derived from the consent of the
people, yet the people do not declare their consent by themselves in person,
but by representatives, chosen by them, who are supposed to know the minds
of their constituents, and to be possessed of integrity to declare this
mind.
In every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by
which they are governed. This is the true criterion between a free
government and an arbitrary one. The former are ruled by the will of the
whole, expressed in any manner they may agree upon; the latter by the will
of one, or a few. If the people are to give their assent to the laws, by
persons chosen and appointed by them, the manner of the choice and the
number chosen, must be such, as to possess, be disposed, and consequently
qualified to declare the sentiments of the people; for if they do not know,
or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do not
govern, but the sovereignty is in a few. Now, in a large extended country,
it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of
integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous
and unwieldly, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a
democratic government.
The territory of the United States is of vast extent; it now contains near
three millions of souls, and is capable of containing much more than ten
times that number. Is it practicable for a country, so large and so numerous
as they will soon become, to elect a representation, that will speak their
sentiments, without their becoming so numerous as to be incapable of
transacting public business? It certainly is not.
In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people should
be similar. If this be not the case, there will be a constant clashing of
opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving
against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government,
and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. If we apply
this remark to the condition of the United States, we shall be convinced
that it forbids that we should be one government. The United States includes
a variety of climates. The productions of the different parts of the union
are very variant, and their interests, of consequence, diverse. Their
manners and habits differ as much as their climates and productions; and
their sentiments are by no means coincident. The laws and customs of the
several states are, in many respects, very diverse, and in some opposite;
each would be in favor of its own interests and customs, and, of
consequence, a legislature, formed of representatives from the respective
parts, would not only be too numerous to act with any care or decision, but
would be composed of such heterogenous and discordant principles, as would
constantly be contending with each other(…)
These are some of the reasons by which it appears, that a free republic
cannot long subsist over a country of the great extent of these states. If
then this new constitution is calculated to consolidate the thirteen states
into one, as it evidently is, it ought not to be adopted.
Though I am of opinion, that it is a sufficient objection to this
government, to reject it, that it creates the whole union into one
government, under the form of a republic, yet if this objection was
obviated, there are exceptions to it, which are so material and fundamental,
that they ought to determine every man, who is a friend to the liberty and
happiness of mankind, not to adopt it. I beg the candid and dispassionate
attention of my countrymen while I state these objections — they are such
as have obtruded themselves upon my mind upon a careful attention to the
matter, and such as I sincerely believe are well founded. There are many
objections, of small moment, of which I shall take no notice — perfection
is not to be expected in any thing that is the production of man — and if I
did not in my conscience believe that this scheme was defective in the
fundamental principles — in the foundation upon which a free and equal
government must rest — I would hold my peace.
Brutus.
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The Federalist
tain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through
a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent, given by the government, or from the contagion of some violent
popular paroxism, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation.
When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions, and dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or control
them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution; and it would be idle to object to a government, because
it could not perform impossibilities.
publius
No. 17
by Alexander Hamilton
The Subject continued, and Illustrated by Examples, to Show
the tendency of Federal Governments, rather to Anarchy
among the Members, than Tyranny in the Head
An objection, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered in my last address, may, perhaps, be urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said, that it would
tend to render the government of the union too powerful, and to enable it to
absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave
with the states for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of
power, which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons entrusted with the administration of the
general government, could ever feel to divest the states of the authorities of
that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a state, appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance,
negotiation, and war, seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms
for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those
objects, ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository.
The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same state;
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No. 17
the supervision of agriculture, and of other concerns of a similar nature; all
those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation,
can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable, that there should exist a disposition in the fe …
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