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COR171
Negotiation and Relationship Management
Tutor-Marked Assignment 01
July 2016 Presentation
Copyright © 2016 SIM University
COR171
Tutor-Marked Assignment
TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT 01
This tutor-marked assignment is worth 40% of the final mark for COR171 Negotiation and
Relationship Management.
The cut-off date for this assignment is 2355hrs on 9 September 2016
___________________________________________________________________________
Submit your solution document in the form of a single MS Word file on or before the cut-off
date shown above.
Additional instructions:
1. You will need to indicate clearly on the front page your name, student ID, course title and
assignment number.
2. You must not copy any case from any course e.g. the internet. If you do, the plagiarism
detection software “Turnitin” will be able to pick it up and you will severely penalised.
You must document all information that you use from another source, or you will be
penalised severely. If you copy from the work of another student, regardless of the
course or programme, you will be severely penalized. You are not permitted to re-use
material from past assignments whether in part or in full. All of the above actions can
result in your failing the TMA.
3. The word limit for each question is 500 words.
___________________________________________________________________________
This TMA assesses the following learning outcomes:
Students should be able to:
• List the various concepts in interest-based negotiations and conflict resolution
• Develop Options and Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
• Describe and explain the interpersonal process of negotiation
• Apply effective communication competence to achieve the desired outcomes
• Analyse the substantive issues in the negotiations
• Apply a principled negotiation approach to achieve good outcomes
SIM UNIVERSITY
Tutor-Marked Assignment 01 – Page 2 of 4
COR171
Tutor-Marked Assignment
The Facts
John and Martha have been good friends since their days in primary school. Unfortunately,
they lost touch over the years and have not seen each other. Now in his second year at SUMO
University, John is an avid dancer who practises regularly and has dreams of making it at
“Steps”, a popular dance competition.
Martha is a recent transfer to SUMO University. She is a business major with an aim to
becoming an established marketing professional in the business world. For the past 2 years,
Martha has been developing her marketing thesis, “Horde”, which requires her to map out her
strategy over a large empty space.
One given day, John arrives at his usual practice room at SUMO University, SR-44, to have
his solo dance practice session. To his shock, he realises that Martha has streamed the whole
room with her marketing notes and post-its, leaving little space to even walk. John is
outraged at this situation and shouts at Martha over her use of SR-44. Martha is surprised at
first, seeing John, and second, at how upset he is. In the process of the argument, John
inadvertently messes up Martha’s notes and post-its, destroying her hours of work. Martha
becomes extremely upset and it is not long before a large crowd gathers outside the room as
other students are soon aware of the commotion. John and Martha are forcibly separated as
the two come close to using force on each other given their state of minds.
Unbeknownst to others, John has recently been in need of money as his dearest grandmother
is critically ill in hospital and, being the only family she has, John has to shoulder the burden
of her medical fees. He is eyeing the top prize of S$50,000 at “Steps” and is confident that his
choreography and skills will land him the victory. He has been practising day and night at
SR-44 and was genuinely shocked at Martha using the space. If he cannot use SR-44 during
his usual slot of 4-9pm, John may be forced to use the Community Centre nearby, but is
concerned that others may see his choreography and end up not doing well for the “Steps”
competition. Privately, John knows that he does not need the entire space of SR-44 for his
dance routine all the time.
Apart from the prize, John wants his skills to be recognised by the public, gain the respect of
his dancing peers and become a renowned dancer. John is also concerned that even if his
skills were to carry him into the primary rounds of the dance competition, he may not have
enough friends or supporters to vote for him in the later rounds. John is introverted and does
not have many friends, even though he would like to befriend more people. On that front,
John does have regrets about how his encounter with Martha happened. He would have
wished to continue their friendship on more amicable terms.
Separately, Martha has been working on “Horde” for the past 2 years, since before her
transfer to SUMO University. She has faced difficulty in developing her marketing thesis, not
having a platform or subject (person) to test “Horde” on. Martha wants to have her thesis
proven right, and is very confident about the success “Horde” will bring. Martha also believes
that given the right opportunity, she could achieve her dream of becoming a prominent
business professional for developing “Horde”. Hopefully, she aims to join “Z”, a famous
business consulting company.
SIM UNIVERSITY
Tutor-Marked Assignment 01 – Page 3 of 4
COR171
Tutor-Marked Assignment
Being innately insecure, she also craves recognition and respect from all. Further to that,
Martha is surprised that an old friend like John would treat her like he did. If anything, she
had been thinking about meeting John in recent times, having heard that he was at SUMO
University. Unfortunately for her, Martha had hoped for a better reunion.
Martha wanted to use SR-44 on a daily basis for the development for “Horde”, given that she
has time from 2-6pm. If she cannot use SR-44, she will be forced to work on “Horde” at her
small apartment at home, which may not be the most conducive. Martha also notes that SR44 may be able to accommodate two people, and that she may not need the entire space in
SR-44 at all times.
As a result of this, both John and Martha are scheduled to attend a counselling session before
you, the Dean of Student Affairs, in order to see how to resolve the problem at hand.
Question 1
List and explain the elements of principled negotiation.
(14 marks)
Question 2
Identify and contrast the difference in Interests between John and Martha.
(40 marks)
Question 3
Analyse the substantive issues in the negotiations and propose 3 possible options for John and
Martha. Explain why each option may be feasible for both parties.
(36 marks)
Question 4
List and analyse the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement for both parties (i.e. state the
BATNA for each party and explain your answer) in their negotiation.
(10 marks)
—– END OF COR171 TMA01 —–
SIM UNIVERSITY
Tutor-Marked Assignment 01 – Page 4 of 4
COR171
Negotiation and Relationship
Management
BOOK OF READINGS
Table of Contents
Extract
1
2
Description
Roger Fisher and Scott Brown,
Getting Together – Building Relations As We
Negotiate, A Note on “Tit-for-Tat”, Page 197-202,
1988, Penguin.
Robert H. Mnookin,
Why Negotiation Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to
the Resolution of Conflict, The Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution, Volume 8, 1993, Number 2,
Page235-249
Reading (s)
for:-
Lesson 3
Lesson 4
1(REPRINTED) ©1988, Penguin: Getting Together – Building Relations As We Negotiate, A Note on “Tit-for-Tat”, Page 197-202 by Roger Fisher and Scott
Brown
2 Reproduced by permission of The Ohio State University College of Law: The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, Volume 8, 1993, Number 2, Page
235-249
r
Building
Relationships
As We
Negotiate
by
Roger Fisher
and
Scott Brown
of the Harvard Negotiation Project
@
Penguin Books
(REPRINTED) ©1988, Penguin: Getting Together – Building Relations As We Negotiate, A Note on “Tit-for-Tat”,
page 197-202 by Roger Fisher and Scott Brown
1
A Note on
((TO !: r-r ))
It-lor-lat
Some game theorists suggest that in a bilateral relationship
the best strategy is a reciprocal one known as tit-for-tat:
after the first interaction, I do to you whatever you did to
me the last time. In many cases, it is not clear whether this
advice is meant to apply to relationship issues as well as to
substantive offers and demands. Since this book reaches
the conclusion that the best guideline for building and maintaining a good working relationship is to act in various ways
that are unconditional- ways that do not reciprocate what
another does – it seems worthwhile to add a note reconciling our conclusion with those who favor tit-for-tat.
Game theorists have compared the dynamics of bilateral
relationships with a model known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma. In one anecdotal illustration of this model, two men
suspected of committing a major crime are confined separately. The prosecutor is certain that they are guilty but
lacks enough evidence to convict them. He tells each suspect that he has a simple choice: confess or not confess. If
the prisoners cooperate with each other and neither confesses, each can expect a one-year sentence for illegal possession of a weapon. If both confess, each will get an eightyear prison sentence for the major crime. If one confesses
and the other does not, the one who refused to confess can
expect a ten-year sentence, but the one who confessed will
198
A NOTE ON “TIT-FOR-TAT”
get lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence and can
expect to get off with simple probation. The prisoners cannot communicate with each other.
Each prisoner now faces a dilemma: “If the other is going
to confess, I’d better do so too, because eight years is better than ten. If the other is not going to confess, I’d better
confess, because then I will get off lightly. It thus
, seems to
be better to confess no matter what the other does. But if
we both confess, we are both worse off than if we both refuse to do so. “*
This model also fits many common situations. Suppose
you and I are trying to decide whether to buy Christmas
presents for each. other. I can buy shirts (which I know you
want) at a discount, and you can buy socks (which you
know I want) at a discount. Each of us must depide without
knowing what the other is going to decide. How generous
should each of us be in buying a present ~nd mailing it off
to the other? If both of us are generous; we come off well.
But in the short run, at least, if you are stingy, I am better
off being stingy. And if you are generous, I am still better
off being stingy. So it looks better for me to be stingy no
matter what you do. And the logic works the same for you.
And yet, if we are both stingy, neither of us gets the benefit
of the discounts. Hence the dilemma.
The following chart illustrates the choices in’a Prisoners’
Dilemma situation. The individual decisions are indicated
by either C (cooperate: be generous) or D (defect: be
stingy).
*This is an edited version of the account given in Duncan R. Luce and
Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley, 1957), p.
95·
A NOTE ON “TlT-FOR-TAT”
199
. YOUR. REHA VIOR
Cooperate
Defect
MY REHA VIOR.
(CC)
Cooperate
I win
You will
Defect
I win big
You lose big
(DC)
(CD)
I lose big
You win big
(DD)
I lose
You lose
If the game is to be played over and over, computer simulations suggest that the best strategy to adopt without
knowing the other person’s strategy (the strategy that yields
the most value after many iterations) is cooperative tit-fortat; that is, cooperate and be “generous” the first time, and
thereafter do whatever the other side did on the previous
excharige.
Within the constraints of the modeJ, tit-for-tat may well
be the best strategy. With regard to some substantive issues, Prisoners’ Dilemma may’ be an apt model and tit-fortat a reasonable strategy. As we have noted, reciprocity is
an appropriate measure of fairness in substantive
negotiations.
Some people infer from this that tit-for-tat is a reasonable
strategy for relationship-building, particularly in foreign relations. Robert Axelrod, in The Evolution of Cooperation
(New York: Basic Books, 1984), notes that tit-for-tat
“might also be useful in promoting cooperation in international politics.” Yes and no. On some substantive matters,
a good way to negotiate may be to act first and call for re-
A NOTE ON “TlT-FOR-TAT”
200
ciprocation. Charles Osgood’s “GRIT” proposal (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 196I]) was based on this theory. But
as a strategy for building a working relationship -. for improving the way we deal with differences – tit-for-tat
would be a mistake. This is true for two reasons:
I. With regard to relationship issues, a bilateral relationship is not a Prisoners’ Dilemma. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, I make myself worse off by being generous if you
are stingy. But with regard to understanding, for example,
if I try to understand you, I am better off regardless of
whether you try to understand me. The more I understand
you, the better I will be able to anticipate your actions even
if they are malicious. This is true for each of the relationship elements discussed in detail in Chapters 4 th~ough 9· I
am better off pursuing a better relationship, regardless of
whether you follow suit. (See the following chart.)
YOUR BEllA VIOR
Cooperate
Defect
(Try to understand) (Do not try)
MY BEHAVIOR
(CC)
Cooperate
(Try to
understand)
Defect
(Do not try)
We both understand each other
well.
(CD)
I understand you
well, but you don’t
understand me.
(DC)
(DD)
I don’t understand
you, but you understand me welL
Neither understands the other.
We continue to do
poorly on problemsolving.
A NOTE ON “TIT-FOR-TAT”
201
Although this chart focuses on the element of understanding, the relative payoffs are the same with regard to
any of the elements of a working relationship. The relative
outcomes are clearly different from those in the Prisoners’
Dilemma scenario. Each of us can be sure that we are better
off if we pursue cooperation on the relationship issues, regardless of how the other responds. There is no dilemma.
Since relationship issues do not fit the Prisoners’ Dilemma model, the analysis suggesting tit-for-tat does not
apply. Furthermore, trying to pursue tit-for-tat on relationship issues may be dangerous.
If we follow a tit-for-tat strategy, partisan perceptions are
likely to lead to malignant spirals in our relationships. In
substantive areas, it may be relatively easy to estimate the
value of the other side’s injury or concession to us. We can
evaluate their move and reciprocate. This is certainly true
in the model of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, where there are
only two possible choices. But in the real world, and with
relationship issues in particular, we tend to see the other’s
actions through our own bias, and we are likely to interpret
their behavior as worse than ours.
If I pursue a policy of tit-for-tat, partisan bias will tend
to cause me to evaluate your behavior as worse than mine
and reciprocate with behavior that is equal in my eyes, but
worse in yours. Since you are likely to interpret mine as
being worse than I thought or intended, you will reciprocate
with behavior that is even worse than your initial behavior.
Since our assessment of the qualities of a working relationship – levels of emotion, understanding, communication,
reliability, acceptance, and noncoercive behavior – is
likely to be highly subjective, a policy of tit-for-tat will lead
to ever-worsening behavior. This is especially true in adversarial relationships, where partisan bias is especially
2.
‘=-
202
A NOTE ON “TlT-FOR-TAT”
strong. In those relationships, a tit-for-tat strategy on relationship behavior could easily lead to a downward spiral of
substantive actions and reactions as well.
Examples of the downward spiral that can result from titfor-tat strategies in international relations are common.
When the United States decided to expel Soviet United Nations diplomats in 1986, the Soviet Union reciprocated. The
U.S. retaliated by expelling more diplomats, and the Soviet
Union responded by withdrawing ali Soviet support staff
from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. This deterioration almost derailed the Reykjavik summit, which was scheduled
for later that year, and may have contributed to the mixed
results of that meeting.
Tit-for-tat may make sense on some substantive issues.
Perhaps it is a good policy for me to give you a present this
Christmas as fine as the one you gave me last year. But on
the qualities identified as crucial to joint problem~solving
there is no dilemma; I can pursue an unconditional strategy
without risk. If you are acting in ways that injure your own
competence, there is no reason for me to do the same. Two
heads are better than one, but one 1S better than none.
Analytical
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTI·9N
Poor choices: three dilemmas’ xii
What is the best way to avoid .disagreement? Should I give
in or sweep a problem under the rug? xii
Should I risk the relationship to get what I want, or should I
sacrifice my interests for the sake of the relationship? xii
Should I take the first step to improve the relationship,
hoping the other person will reciprocate, or should I wait
and see what he does and respond accordingly? xii
Pursue a “working” relationship
xiii
Separate the people from the problem
Be unconditionally constructive
xiii
xiv
I. An Overview
Chapter I: THE GOAL
. A relationship that can deal well with differences
What.we want and what we need in a relationship are unclear 3
We use the words “relations” and “relationship” in many
ways 3
We confuse good relations with approval 4
We are confused by the role of shared values 5
We see our goal as avoiding disagreement 5
Who “we” are is treated as fixed 6
-” …..;:.
Reproduced by permission of The Ohio State University College of Law: The Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, Volume 8,
1993, Number 2, Page 235-249
…
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