I need a paper edited. The two attached papers labeled “paper (1)” and “paper (2)” are the same but written slightly different. I need them to be edited (they’re basically one paper) and I need them to look like the attached “example” paper as much as possible. Please go through the example paper thoroughly because the papers need to be like that. The paper is based on the attached article, they are labeled as “article (1)” and “article (2)” So to put it simply there should be only one argument and one critical paper in total that looks like the example paper except its based on a different article.
article__1_.docx

article__2_.docx

paper__1_.doc

paper__2_.doc

example.docx

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Running head: SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
Should Doctors Tell the Truth
Institution Affiliation
Date
1
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
2
Argument analysis
Collins argues that it is usually necessary for doctors not to reveal the whole information
to their patients on their conditions since it affects their psychological well-being. This is due to
the consideration of the way the patients would deal with their actual situations which may affect
their medication.
The first premise is that Collins tends to argue that concealment of the truth is suitable in
cases where doctors are treating individuals suffering from serious illnesses. This is because it
tends to affect their mental well-being as they get worried about their situation and reduce the
focus on their suitable medication.
The second premise is that practitioners are supposed to include some untruth sentiments
while describing the actual situation of a patient’s illness. This has the ability to make them be
able to cope with their conditions and if too severe, they could prevent depression of these
individuals. However, the doctors are expected not to lie to their patients about their illnesses
hence the need to convey their conditions with an addition of some lies with the ability to make
the situation seem less serious.
The third premise is that there are also circumstances where the patients require the plain
facts on their conditions. Some of these people are normally prepared for any kind of news and
they need the facts to enable them to plan their medication. However, there exists those who ask
for the facts but lack the psychological ability to deal with the truth. These are the kind of
individuals that require the truth to be combined with some lies to soften the actual situation.
Collins continues and provides some examples of when the truth was concealed to a patient and
ended up being beneficial to them (Collins, 1927). This example included a patient who suffered
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
3
from a chronic disorder of the spinal cord and he was explained that he had a distinct kind of
rheumatism. This enabled him to provide resistance in his body which was necessary for coping
with the condition other than telling the actual facts which could have led to depression.
Therefore, the concealing of the actual facts of the patient’s conditions is normally
helpful to the patients psychologically since it helps them have the ability to cope with their
situations. In circumstances that the patients request for the plain facts, this should be provided to
them if they are strong enough. Those that request the facts and lack the ability to cope with the
situation could have the truth being mixed with some lies so as to make the situation seem less
serious. It is usually necessary for doctors not to reveal the whole information to their patients on
their conditions
Critical discussion
Collins argues that the doctors should conceal some of the information on the condition
of their patients so as to protect their psychological wellbeing. I will, however, argue against
him and prove that this is wrong due to the following reasons.
My first premise is that this notion is inappropriate as the patients are entitled to the
actual facts of their conditions however serious they may be. This is because it would help them
have the ability to prepare to deal with the forthcoming requirements for their medication.
My second premise is that Collins is wrong for claiming that the patients should have
their information concealed since the law gives them the entitlement of information about their
conditions. Even though they lack the psychological ability to deal with the truth, the physician
is supposed to give provide them with the facts and never mix with some lies. Lying would
amount to unethical conduct in the profession which requires the individuals to carry out their
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
4
duties with competence and morals (Fletcher, 2015). They should, however, consider involving a
therapist to convey the truth about the patient’s condition since they have the skill to tactically
inform the patients without significantly affecting their psychological well-being.
My final premise is that Collins is not putting into consideration the possibility of having
their patients seeking the wrong medication for their conditions. This may normally happen in
situations where the patients decide to purchase medicines without the prescription of their
doctors. They end up buying the wrong medicines if they were lied to by the doctor on their
condition. Therefore, complications become likely which may lead to their inability to heal. The
family of the patients should, however, be informed of the actual facts of the illness and then
give them the choice to decide if they would inform the patient. This is in a situation where the
doctor is unable to inform the patient of their actual condition due to its seriousness since it is
normally a professional obligation to inform the patients on their illnesses.
Therefore, I have had an argument against Collins’ notions. He argues that doctors should
conceal some of the information on the condition of their patients so as to protect their
psychological wellbeing. The physicians are not expected to lie about the situations of their
patients since this would lead to unethical conduct of the professional. The patients are supposed
to have the actual information on their conditions since it would help them have the ability to
prepare to deal with the forthcoming requirements for their medication. These errors in the
arguments of Collins together with mine indicate that there exists a reference letdown.
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
References
Collins, J. (1927). Should doctors tell the truth? Harpers, 155(927), 320-326.
Fletcher, J. F. (2015). Morals and Medicine: the moral problems of the patient’s right to know
the truth, contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization, euthanasia. Princeton
University Press.
5
Running head: SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
Should Doctors Tell the Truth
Institution Affiliation
Date
1
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
2
Argument analysis
Introduction
There is a debate of whether the physicians are supposed to reveal the truth about the
conditions of their patients. This is due to the consideration of the way the patients would deal
with their actual situations which may affect their medication. The author of this article tends to
argue that concealment of the truth is suitable in cases where doctors are treating
individuals suffering from serious illnesses. This is because it tends to affect their mental wellbeing as they get worried about their situation and reduce the focus on their suitable medication.
Other patients may panic after knowing the truth which may make them not to recover as
scheduled by the doctor.
Reasons for concealing the truth
The author argues that it is usually necessary not to reveal the whole information to their
patients on their conditions since it affects their psychological well-being. Practitioners are
supposed to include some untruth sentiments while describing the actual situation of a patient’s
illness. This has the ability to make them be able to cope with their conditions and if too severe,
they could prevent depression of these individuals. However, the doctors are expected not to lie
to their patients about their illnesses hence the need to convey their conditions with an addition
of some lies with the ability to make the situation seem less serious.
There are also circumstances where the patients require for the plain facts on their
conditions. Some of these people are normally prepared for any kind of news and they need the
facts to enable them to plan their medication. However, there exists those who ask for the facts
but lack the psychological ability to deal with the truth. These are the kind of individuals that
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
3
require the truth to be combined with some lies to soften the actual situation. Collins continues
and provides some examples of when the truth was concealed to a patient and ended up being
beneficial to them (Collins, 1927). This example included a patient who suffered from a chronic
disorder of the spinal cord and he was explained that he had a distinct kind of rheumatism. This
enabled him to provide resistance in his body which was necessary for coping with the condition
other than telling the actual facts which could have led to depression.
Conclusion
Therefore, the concealing of the actual facts of the patient’s conditions is normally
helpful to the patients psychologically since it helps them have the ability to cope with their
situations. In circumstances that the patients request for the plain facts, this should be provided to
them if they are strong enough. Those that request the facts and lack the ability to cope with the
situation could have the truth being mixed with some lies so as to make the situation seem less
serious.
Critical discussion
Introduction
The author claims it is essential for physicians to conceal some information about the
health of their patients. This is the reason that they could not be able to deal with the actual facts
of their illnesses. However, this notion is inappropriate as the patients are entitled to the
actual facts of their conditions however serious they are. This is because it would help them
have the ability to prepare to deal with the forthcoming requirements for their medication.
They deserve to know facts of their illness in order to know what challenge they are facing. The
truth will also enable the patients seek the right medication.
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
4
Defense of the premise
The writer is wrong for claiming that the patients should have their information
concealed since the law gives them the entitlement of information about their conditions. Even
though they lack the psychological ability to deal with the truth, the physician is supposed to
give them with the facts and never mix with some lies. Lying would amount to unethical conduct
in the profession which requires the individuals to carry out their duties with competence and
morals (Fletcher, 2015). They should, however, consider involving a therapist to convey the truth
about the patient’s condition since they have the skill to tactically inform the patients without
significantly affecting their psychological well-being.
The author is not putting into consideration the possibility of having their patients
seeking the wrong medication for their conditions. This may normally happen in situations where
the patients decide to purchase medicines without the prescription of their doctors. They end up
buying the wrong medicines if they were lied to by the doctor on their condition. Therefore,
complications become likely which may lead to their inability to heal. The family of the patients
should, however, be informed of the actual facts of the illness and then give them the choice to
decide if they would inform the patient. This is in a situation where the doctor is unable to
inform the patient of their actual condition due to its seriousness since it is normally a
professional obligation to inform the patients on their illnesses.
Conclusion
Therefore, patients are usually entitled by the law to information on the facts of their
conditions. The physicians are not expected to lie about the situations of their patients since this
would lead to unethical conduct of the professional. The patients are supposed to have the actual
SHOULD DOCTORS TELL THE TRUTH
5
information on their conditions since it would help them have the ability to prepare to deal with
the forthcoming requirements for their medication.
References
Collins, J. (1927). Should doctors tell the truth? Harpers, 155(927), 320-326.
Fletcher, J. F. (2015). Morals and Medicine: the moral problems of the patient’s right to know
the truth, contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization, euthanasia. Princeton
University Press.
Color Coding:
Thesis/conclusion
Structural (letting the reader know what’s going on. Statements like these remind the reader
what is being currently discussed.)
Authors first premise
Defense of author’s first premise
Author’s second premise
Defense of author’s second premise
Authors third premise
Defense of third premise
My first premise
Defense of my first premise
My second premise
Defense of my second premise
My third premise
Defense of my third premise
(s(Stuff I added so you might have a rough idea what I was talking about but I gave up adding
this kind of thing)
Argument Analysis
Han argues in “There is No Such Thing as Reference Failure” just that; there is no such thing as
reference failure. (Reference failure is the supposed failure of a referring expression to refer to
anything). Han’s argument against empty names has three premises. His premises are: there are two
kinds of empty names which are expressions we know don’t refer and expressions we don’t know don’t
refer, we can’t use a non referring expression as a referring expression, and to use an expression to refer
when it in fact does not is to not use a name at all. Therefore there are no empty names.
While Han does not explicitly state it as such, his first premise is that he divides empty names
into two categories: those which we know do not refer, and those which we mistakenly believe refer.
Han intends this list to be exhaustive. His second premise concerns expressions such as Zeus, where we
know there is no referent. Han claims it is irrational to use an expression to refer when in fact we know
it does not. Han does not go so far as to claim it is inconsistent to do so, but we could draw out an
argument that a speaker is acting inconsistently when believing they are using an expression to refer
while it does it. This mirrors Moore’s paradox; “X, but I do not believe X”.
The third premise concerns the second type of empty name’ those which we mistakenly believe
refer when in fact they do not. Take for example the supposed planet Vulcan. (In the 19th century,
French astronomer Le Verrier proposed a planet between Mercury and the sun to help explain
perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. He named the planet Vulcan. Later it was discovered that it was
not a new planet, but in fact the effects of Relativity which caused the perturbations in Mercury’s orbit,
so Vulcan is an empty name.) Suppose now some person who never learned that Vulcan was disproven
attempts to refer to Vulcan by saying “Vulcan has a small diameter”. Han argues that this is not an
example of reference failure because Vulcan, though it appears to be, is not a referring expression. Han
defends this claim by stating that the use of any expressions entails the intention of the original use of
said expression. The original use of Vulcan was a description such as “The planet which perturbs the
orbit of Mercury”. So a current user of Vulcan is using it as a description, not as name. Therefore, there
are no empty names.
Critical Discussion
Han argues that there are no empty names, I will argue Han is mistaken on three accounts. Han
fails to consider referring expressions other than proper names, Han conflates irrational with
inconsistent, and Han’s semantics for names entails a contradiction.
My first premise is to show Han fails to consider referring expressions other than empty proper
names.Han assumes without stating it that there are only two types of referring expressions which
might fail to refer. Han only addresses proper names, however there are natural kind terms as well as
definite descriptions. Whether or not definite descriptions such as “the one and only X such that…” is
controversial. Russel did not treat definite descriptions as referring expressions but rather as
existentially quantified sentences in which the conditions for the variable are met or are not met. Other
philosophers such as Frege allow for such definite descriptions to refer. Natural kind terms, if they exist,
trivially refer. The natural kind term water refers to just that thing which is H20. And famously, examples
like Jade turn out not to have been natural kind terms after all, referring instead to two different
minerals, making Jade an example of reference failure.
My second premise is to argue against Han’s claim that it is irrational to use an expression which
we do not know refers as a referring expression. However names like Santa Clause are names which
adults know do not refer, yet we use them as such in a fiction we tell to children. When parents tell
children “Santa Clause will come tonight”, they are expressing two sentences. One which is meant to be
parsed by adults as “The parents will put presents under the tree tonight, but the fiction of Santa Clause
is meant for the kids”. The other sentence is meant to be interpreted by the kids as “Santa Clause will
come tonight.” The second meaning contains an empty name, and it is intended as an empty name. This
is neither irrational nor inconsistent. Furthermore it is intended that the children use that name as a
referring expression. The intent to use the expression as a referring one leads me to my last premise.
Finally, my last argument is to show Han’s semantics entail an unintuitive and incorrect
understanding of intent. Han claims that the use of an expression entails the use of the original intention
of that expression. This means that even if I intend to use Vulcan as a referring expression, Han’s
semantics require that despite my a priori belief that I am intending to use an expression as a referring
one, my belief is in fact incorrect. This is contradictory. As we have a priori privileged access to our own
beliefs about how we intend to use an expression, Han’s semantics entail a belief state of “I believe I am
intending to use Vulcan to refer and I do not intend to use Vulcan to refer.” Not only is this a
contradiction, it entails that the external world will determine our beliefs of our intent, regardless of
what we believe our own intent is. As we have a priori privileged access to such beliefs, they can never
be wrong.
I have argued against Han’s conclusion. Han argues that there is no such thing as reference
failure on the grounds that it is irrational to use names we know do not refer as referring expression and
expressions we mistaking use to refer entail a disjunctive semantics. I have argued Han fails to consider
other referring expressions, he equivocates irrational and inconsistent, and his external semantics
require a contradiction as well as violating intuitive a priori beliefs. These mistakes in Han’s arguments
as well as my own arguments show that there is reference failure.
1.

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